Hamas'
rise to power offers Israel the opportunity to correct past policy
mistakes.
February 17th, 2006
Hamas' rise to power offers Israel the opportunity to correct past
policy mistakes. But only if it acts quickly against the Hamas
terror entity.
When Oslo was first launched, the Israelis leaders involved
genuinely believed that the only armed Palestinian group this side
of the Jordan River would be a relatively small and lightly armed
Palestinian police force. Today the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are
teeming with various Palestinian armies - both official and
illegal. With the PA now officially lead by the terrorist Hamas
movement, and thus the Palestinian security forces also ultimately
officially acting in the service of Hamas, Israel has every
justification in the world to impose a blanket "no rifle" rule in
West Bank and Gaza Strip.
A rule enforced by a shoot to kill policy. Any time. Anywhere.
When Fatah ruled the PA. U.S. Secretary of State Rice pressed Israel
to give the Palestinians the final say as to who and what could
cross between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Israel now has every
justification to insist that this reckless arrangement be
dropped. As the "second intifada" winded down, the Sharon team
accepted a cease fire that allowed the illegal Palestinian armies to
arm and train as long as they didn't shoot [too much] with the
expectation that ultimately the PA itself would address the problem.
Hamas' rise to power puts an end to this fantasy. It may not be easy
for Israel to clear out the terrorist armies that blossomed during
the security hiatus - but it would be considerably more costly to
allow them to remain. Mr. Olmert's campaign advisors apparently
believe that some announcements relating to future funds transfers
and tightening restriction on movement will suffice in the eyes of
the Israeli voters. But the purpose of the exercise at this critical
time is not simply to avoid dropping too many points in the public
opinion polls. It must be to restore the balance that has
been so dangerously disturbed.
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Launching
the policy debate in Israel
February 9th, 2006
With less than two month left before Israelis cast their ballots in
the national elections it remains painfully unclear if what may be
the most critical vote since the founding of the Jewish State will
take place without any serious policy debate.
As both acting PM Olmert and DM Mofaz made clear in recent
presentations, if Kadima forms the next government they intend to
carry out major unilateral retreats in the West Bank after
establishing that the Palestinians continue to fail to fulfill their
Roadmap obligations to break up the terror infrastructure. These
retreats are to ostensibly unilaterally "set" Israel's permanent
borders. But as U.S. Secretary of State Rice made clear this week in
her press conference with FM Livni, while Israel can retreat as much
as it wants, it is America's position that Israel's permanent
borders can only be set via negotiations with the Palestinians. As
was the case before the retreat from Gaza, Olmert again makes no
bones that he is clueless as to who or what will fill the void
- and doesn't care.
That's right. A Kadima headed government will retreat even if it
means that a sovereign Hamas state fills the void. It is interesting
to note that the Meretz Party now takes the position that leaving a
void by retreating is too dangerous. They propose that Israel only
withdraw if an international third party is willing and able to take
over control of the vacated territory. Meretz is ostensibly to the
Left of Kadima, but given Kadima's "retreat at any cost" program it
might be more accurate to place Kadima in the radical fringe.
And what about border security?
Before the retreat from Gaza, the Sharon team was confident that
arrangements would be made to insure that the Palestinians would not
be able to exploit access to the outside world for the free movement
of terrorists or dangerous contraband.
They were dead wrong.
After the retreat the Sharon team buckled to pressure from U.S.
Secretary of State Rice and made the critical precedent setting
concession of giving the Palestinians the final say on both who and
what can pass through the Rafah Crossing, turning the international
observers into nothing more than window dressing. An arrangement
that is supposed to be a model for the Gaza airport and seaport. The
same thing would happen in the West Bank. Yes, Olmert speaks vaguely
about securing Israel's eastern border, but even if he doesn't
immediately abandon the entire Jordan Valley as part of the retreat
(as was the case with the Philadelphi Corridor, the narrow strip of
land separating between Egypt and Gaza that Israel abandoned as part
of the Gaza retreat) it is more than reasonable to assume that
Olmert would quickly yield to pressure to provide for a Palestinian
controlled access way to Jordan. An access way operating under the
very same arrangements that the Sharon team so recklessly accepted
at the Rafah Crossing.
All of the elements for a hot debate are in place: a dangerous
policy based on a house of cards of assumptions that have already
crumbled in Gaza. But Olmert refuses to debate. And the news media
doesn't seem to care. Can Netanyahu's campaign team raise interest
in the policy debate in the absence of Olmert?
There certainly is a clear and harsh message to be delivered: a
vote for Kadima is a vote for a reckless and unworkable policy that,
if implemented, would cost Israel dearly. Yes, it isn't easy to
break this up into the 8 second / 7 word chunks that are
unfortunately the upper limit of the attention spans of much of the
Israeli voting public. But a skilled campaign copywriter can do it.
That's what they are paid to do. The billboards, internet websites
and public soundbites should already be full of these chunks
today. Chunks that tell a unified story drawing voters to the
conclusion that Kadima's retreat plan is so profoundly dangerous
that no other consideration could justify casting a ballot in favor
of Kadima.
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Will Olmert's move against settlers quash the retreat debate?
February 1st, 2006
Whether they planned it all along or simply stumbled into it, the
Olmert teams' decision to try and carry out a series of high profile
assaults against settlers over the course of the period leading to
election day is sheer genius. Olmert's team didn't have to poll much
to find that many of Kadima's potential supporters from the Left and
Left-Center would like nothing more than to see settlers "put in
their place" with the television screens filled with images of Jews
being dragged from their homes in various outposts and elsewhere in
the West Bank. It's a win-win situation for Olmert: if a massive
show of force causes the settlers to leave passively it's a victory
- and if security forces have to break bones - or worse - to show
whose boss - that's also a vote getter.
Olmert's
team, with the cooperation of the media, can market these
"victories" over the settlers as proof of his ability to handle
Israel's security challenges despite his lack of prior experience.
To their credit, the advisors behind the Kadima Party have already
anticipated the negative impact that pre-election terror attacks
could have on Olmert's image. With the help of COS Halutz and
others, the bloody second Intifada period has been set as the
benchmark for terror, so even if literally hundreds are murdered in
terror attacks before election day it can be claimed that terror is
down.
But should the ability to uproot settlers from their homes be the
defining qualification for candidates in the upcoming elections?
It might be if uprooting some settlers was the only thing holding up
the implementation of a popular final status agreement that had
already passed the confirmation process - or if retreat was a
foregone conclusion. But no one seriously claims an agreement is
even close to being reached - and that's with or without Israel
standing its ground on requiring the PA to actually disarm the
terrorists before the talks start. That's disarm - not simply put
on the PA security forces payroll. As for retreat: it isn't a
foregone conclusion - it's the true issue of the elections.
Time and again polls demonstrate that the Israeli public opposes
retreat. The public has no problem appreciating just how reckless
further retreats in the West Bank would be. In point of fact, most
of those who supported Ariel Sharon preferred him despite - rather
than because - of his plans to carry out additional retreats after
the elections. That's why the Olmert team intends to upstage the
retreat debate with media coverage of security operations against
settlers. They know that if the elections turn into a debate over
policy, support could plummet.
For the sake of Israel one can only hope that Netanyahu and the rest
of the national camp are up to the formidable task of convincing the
citizenry to vote for policy rather than personality.
